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with Verene's general account of  the Phenomenology. To put it bluntly: if Verene is 
right about the nature of  Absolute Knowledge and of  Philosophical Science, then 
Hegel is wrong---or else he is a greater ironist than even Bertolt Brecht suspected. Or 
perhaps the irony lies in the interpretation itself, which may be just a shade too 
ingenious. Is it really necessary to destroy the Phenomenology in order to save it? 
DANIEL BREAZEALE 
University of Kentucky 
Dick Howard. From Marx to Kant. SUNY Series in Philosophy. Albany: State Univer- 
sity of  New York Press, x985. Pp. xiv + 3oo. Cloth, $39.5 o. Paper, $a4.95. 
During the past decade Dick Howard has been arguing that we need a return of  "the 
political." From Marx to Kant continues this argument, and as the title suggests, its 
main thesis is that the work of  Kant, not that of  Marx and Hegel, formulates a 
suitable theoretic platform for expressing this need. But what is meant by "the 
political"? In an earlier book, Howard writes: "My frequent use of  the concept of  'the 
political' has been criticized by friends who find i t . . .  too vague. ''1 A similar criticism 
can be launched in general against his latest book: crucial terms are seldom sharply 
defined and the line of  argument  is often unclear. Nonetheless, we can discern that 
the call for a return of  the political is basically a plea for the creation of  a public 
sphere in which citizens actively exercise their political judgment.  Thus what charac- 
terizes the political is not power and group interests but the existence of  a wide- 
spread public debate on moral, social, economic, and political issues. Another essen- 
tial feature that Howard ascribes to the political is that it is open-ended: normative 
claims that emerge within this sphere are continually put into question. One impor- 
tant ramification of  this interrogative structure of  the political is that it contradicts 
the view that history has some definite and final telos. 
We may extrapolate from these two aspects of  the political two reasons why 
Howard holds that we need a return of  the political: political decision-making cannot 
be left to legislators alone but also requires extensive public debate; and, political 
enlightenment is a continuous and dialogical learning process. From this perspective 
it is not surprising that he rejects the work of  Marx and Hegel as inadequately 
expressing the need for a return of  the political. He argues, for example, that Marx 
offered a flawed economic substitute for the political by claiming that the develop- 
mental logic of  capital would transform the proletariat from a universal class "in 
itself" to a universal class "for itself" (i.e., as conscious of  its historical mission). 
Reproduction of  capitalist ideology is seen as one negative result of  this reductionistic 
1. The Marxian Legacy (New York: Urizen Books, 1977), xii. In my description of Howard's 
concept of the political I have also used his "The Politics of Modernism: From Marx to Kant," 
Philosophy & Social Criticism 8:4 (Winter a981 ). 
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schema of  political enl ightenment  from without; another  is repression by the Leninist 
vanguard party. Addit ionally,  Howard  repudiates,  of  course, Marx's contention that 
communism solves the "r iddle of  history." He is equally critical of  Kant's ethics, 
expounding  the (all-too) familiar thesis that this ethics is centered a round  a formal 
monological subject - - the  good will. His alternative is a political reconstruction of  
Critique of Judgment. The  esthetic j u d g m e n t  as a reflective judgmen t  can function as a 
model  for political j udgmen t .  Howard  argues that political j udgmen t  in this form 
expresses the theoretical possibility of  and need for a re turn  of  the political: "The 
discursive process by which reflective j udgmen t  establishes validity claims moves be- 
yond the formal  monological subject. Reflective j udgmen t  obeys the imperative to 
' think in the place of  the other ' .  It  implies the existence of  a common, and ultimately 
a communal,  sense that permits  this interchange" (65). In other words, the existence 
of  "common sense" makes possible that political decision-making is rooted in general  
public debate,  whereas the maxims of  this common sense signify that adequate politi- 
cal will-formation can only be reached through such a debate. From Marx to Kant 
concludes that Perpetual Peace puts flesh on these bare bones. Howard's  interpreta-  
tion of  the right to universal hospitality may serve here as an example: "The 'law of  
hospitality' demands  that the part icular  states interact explicitly. They must commu- 
nicate, exchange, learn to think in the place of  the other. Isolationism would fix their 
content like a contract  that shuts off  fur ther  enlightenment" (267). 
Howard 's  project  is incomplete in at least three respects. First, his book leaves the 
question open whether  the Kantian republic as an instance of  the political is consis- 
tent with a capitalist economy. This is unsatisfactory, not only in light of  Kant's own 
view on this question but  also because it obscures the reason for Howard's  concern 
with Marx in the first place. Second, the book does not provide a detailed discussion 
of  various problems that arise from making the judgmen t  of  taste the model  for 
political j u d g m e n t ?  Thi rd ,  it leaves us with an unresolved tension in Kant's work 
between a "closed" monological ethics and an open-ended dialogical politics.~ The  
viability of  Howard 's  project depends  on whether it can successfully come to terms 
with these three issues. 
HARRY VAN DER LINDEN 
Colgate University 
~. Such a discussion can be found in Ronald Beiner, Political Judgment (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1983). Beiner and Howard share a common view of the political. 
Their political reconstruction of Critique of Judgment is based on Hannah Arendt's earlier at- 
tempt in Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982 ) . 
The other major influence on Howard's Kant interpretation is the work ofJi~rgen Habermas. 
3- One solution to this problem is to reconstruct Kant's ethics as dialogical and as formu- 
lating an open-ended historical ideal--the moral society of colegislators. The neo-Kantian 
Hermann Cohen developed this line in Ethik des reinen Willens. Howard, however, dismisses 
the Marburg School (283n.), wrongly holding that his marginal criticism of Karl Vorllinder 
implies a rebuttal of Cohen as well. 
